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Abstract
Secure Role Based Messaging (SRBM) augments mes-
saging systems with role oriented communication in a se-
cure manner. Role occupants can sign and decrypt mes-
sages on behalf of roles. This paper identifies the require-
ments of SRBM and recognises the need for: distributed
key shares, fast membership revocation, mandatory security
controls and detection of identity spoofing. A shared RSA
scheme is constructed. RSA keys are shared and distributed
to role occupants and role gate keepers. Role occupants
and role gate keepers must cooperate together to use the
key shares to sign and decrypt the messages. Role occupant
signatures can be verified by an audit service. A SRBM sys-
tem architecture is developed to show the security related
performance of the proposed scheme, which also demon-
strates the implementation of fast membership revocation,
mandatory security control and prevention of spoofing. It
is shown that the proposed scheme has successfully coupled
distributed security with mandatory security controls to re-
alize secure role based messaging.
1. Introduction
The Secure Role based Messaging (SRBM) model [4]
provides a model for role oriented communication. Role
occupants share role identities and are authorised to sign
and decrypt messages on behalf of roles.
The SRBM model requires role signatures and optional
encryption over all messages, which raises the challenge
of sharing the private keys of the roles. SRBM systems
have various implementation models. Some systems may
directly share role private keys among all role occupants
but this model suffers from the difficulty of key revocation.
In central wrapping systems a trusted entity is employed
to manage all the role private keys and key uses, but the
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trusted entity will be subject to attacks and forms a single
point of failure [4]. Group signature and threshold cryptog-
raphy systems promote distributed key sharing but they lack
mechanisms to impose mandatory security controls.
SRBM system proposed here extracts the particular ad-
vantages of the above models whilst avoiding their disad-
vantages. Our system shares role private keys between
role occupants and a trusted role gate keeper. Key shares
are used cooperatively by role occupants and the role gate
keeper. It also implements fast membership revocation and
supports mandatory security audit and controls. We propose
a distributed RSA scheme for our SRBM architecture.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2
presents a secure role based messaging scenario and the
challenges it presents. Section 3 describes our distributed
RSA scheme Section 4 describes the architecture of our
SRBM system. Section 5 performs a security analysis on
the proposed scheme. Section 6 compares our SRBM sys-
tem to previous research and the conclusions are presented
in Section 7.
2. A Scenario and the Challenges
The following is a hypothesised scenario for a SRBM
system. Alice and Bob are both sales people in ABC Ltd,
and the Sales Gate Keeper is a mail gateway for the Sales
department. Alice, Bob and the Sales Gate Keeper each
hold a share of the private key of the role Sales. Alice
and Bob can send digitally signed messages and receive en-
crypted messages on behalf of the role Sales but the signing
and decryption only succeeds when they are performed with
the help of the Sales Gate Keeper. Collusion between Alice
and Bob will not reveal any information about the Sales’
role private key, and will not help them to sign or decrypt
role based messages. Similarly the Sales Gate Keeper can
not sign or decrypt role based messages without the partici-
pation of either Alice or Bob. Finally, the Sales Gate Keeper
is not able to produce any plain text information when it
helps Alice and Bob to decrypt role based messages.
The Sales Gate Keeper can audit all communications and
impose security controls such as checking if attachments are
classified or if recipients have the proper authority to read
a message. The Sales Gate Keeper will only cooperate to
sign or decrypt messages that are allowed by the messaging
policies and the audit policies.
To revoke a role membership, the system can simply
inform the Sales Gate Keeper of the revocation, and the
Sales Gate Keeper will no longer cooperate with the re-
voked member. The membership revocation is transparent
to the other parties, and there is no need to change the role
Sales’ public key or private key.
To implement the above scenario, a key management
scheme must be developed which allows the private keys
to be shared among members and a trusted entity (the role
gate keeper). Collusion amongst members will not reveal
the private keys. Members can use their key shares to sign
or decrypt messages on behalf of their roles only when they
succeed in acquiring the help of the trusted entity.
The trusted entity must be designed in a way that break-
ing the trusted entity on its own must not threaten the secu-
rity of the whole system, and there should be a way for se-
cure recovery. Whilst the trusted entity is involved in mes-
sage decryption, the plaintext should not be revealed by it.
For accountability purposes, a signature produced by a
role occupant using its key share should be able to be ver-
ified against its identity, thereby authenticating the signer.
Role occupants should not be allowed to spoof their identi-
ties when performing their role based duties.
A mandatory security control is required to enforce local
security policies and message based policies. All commu-
nications must be subject to the security control before the
messages are delivered to the role recipients or accessed by
the role occupants.
3. The Distributed RSA Scheme
This section presents the proposed key management
scheme which splits a private key into two shares which
are distributed to the role occupant and a role gatekeeper.
This allows the two entities to hold the shares and to coop-
erate to digitally sign and decrypt messages. The role gate-
keeper’s share is then split again, one part is kept secret to
the gatekeeper and the other part is given to an auditor. The
auditor’s key may be made public or kept secret, depending
upon the wishes of the organisation for who can perform an
audit of the signatures.
Let < er, Nr > and < dr, Nr > be the role pubic key
and the role private key respectively of role r, where modu-
lusNr = p× q and φ(Nr) = (p− 1)× (q− 1), p and q are
primes.
Let the occupant j of role r be denoted as o(r, j). The
occupant’s key share is kr,j , and the Role Gate Keeper’s key
share is sr,j and vr,j . The share vr,j is the Auditor’s verifi-
cation key share. The key shares are generated as follows.
sr,j = f(r, j,Sr)
vr,j = f(r, j,Vr)
kr,j = dr − sr,j × vr,j (mod φ(Nr))
where f(x, y, z) is a public function that is easy to compute
but is difficult to reverse. Sr is a secret managed by the
Role Keeper for role r . Vr is a random number known to
the Auditors and Role Keeper for role r . The role occupant
can construct a private key < kr,j , Nr >, the Gate Keeper
can construct corresponding private keys < sr,j , Nr > and
< vr,j , Nr >. The Auditors can generate the verification
key < vr,j , Nr > for every o(r, j).
3.1. Signature Generation
The signing is a three phase process, including role oc-
cupant (RO) Signing, Role Keeper (RK) Signing, and Com-
bining Signatures.
RO Signing. The RO o(r, j) produces an initial mes-
sage signature sgro(r, j,m) = mkr,j (mod Nr). In
other words, the role occupant o(r, j) use his own key
< kr,j , Nr > to sign the message.
Keeper signing. The RO computes a signature
sgkp(r, j,m) = msr,j (mod Nr) by using the key <
sr,j , Nr >.
Combining signatures. The signatures produced above
can be combined together as the final signature sg(r,m).
sg(r,m) = sgro(r, j,m) × sgkp(r, j,m)vr,j (mod Nr) =
mdr (mod Nr). The newly produced signature sg(r,m)
is the same as the normal signature generated by using the
private key < dr, Nr >.
3.2. Decryption
A messagem is encrypted for the role r using r’s public
key < er, Nr > as follows. em = mer (mod Nr). De-
crypting em involves the RK Decryption, the RO Decryp-
tion and Reconstructing the plaintext.
Keeper Decryption. The RK partially decrypts the mes-
sage in two steps. First, the RK uses the key < sr,j , Nr >
to perform a normal RSA decryption as below. ˆemkp(r,j) =
emsr,j (mod Nr). Then the RK performs a second
RSA decryption using the verification key < vr,j , Nr >.
emkp(r,j) = ( ˆemkp(r,j))vr,j (mod Nr).
RO Decryption. The RO decrypts the original message us-
ing the key < kr,j , Nr > using normal RSA decryption.
emo(r,j) = emkr,j (mod Nr).
Plaintext Construction. With the RK Decryption result
emkp(r,j), and the RO decryption result emo(r,j), the plain-
text m can be reconstructed. m = emkp(r,j) × emo(r,j)
(mod Nr) = m (mod Nr).
In summary, decryption needs the role occupant and the
keeper to each decrypt the message into two partially de-
crypted messages. The two partially decrypted messages
are then used to reconstruct the plaintext.
3.3. Audit
The auditing process verifies whether the RO signature
is generated by the claimed RO based on the specified mes-
sage. In order to perform an audit, the Auditor needs to
know the original message, the ID of the role occupant, the
ID of the role, the partial signatures generated by the role
occupant and the Role Gatekeeper, and Vr.
Assuming that the claimed identity of the role occu-
pant is fake, let m denote the message hash that is signed,
sgkp(r, j
′
,m) is the signature generated by the keeper us-




,m) is the signature gen-
erated by the role occupant using the identity o(r, j
′′
),
and o(r, j) is claimed to be the identity of the origi-
nal signer. The audit service will construct a role sig-
nature mv(r, j,m) = sgro(r, j
′′
,m) × sgkp(r, j′ ,m)vr,j






Then the audit service can compute a hash value hv by







• If and only if j = j′ = j′′ then hv =
m(kr,j+sr,j×vr,j)×er (mod N)r = m, which means
that if the given signatures of the keeper and the role
occupant are produced based on the same identity as
recorded by the audit trail, then the verification process
succeeds with hv = m. Thus it is believed that the
identity of the role occupant is o(r, j).






′×vr,j)×er (mod N)r 6= m. This means
that at least one of the given signatures is not produced
based on o(r, j), and a fraud took place. Similar con-
clusions can be made over role identities.
In summary, the role occupant identity is believed to be
true only when the audit process can use the claimed iden-
tity of the role occupant to construct a valid role signature
based on the information provided by the audit log.
4. Managed Messaging System Architecture
The system architecture presented in Figure 1 constructs
a SRBM system based on the key management scheme de-
scribed in Section 3. The SRBM system architecture com-
prises of several main elements, including the Key Genera-
tion CA (KGCA), the Auditor, the Role Keeper (RK), and
the role occupants (ROs). The KGCA is a trusted author-
ity responsible for issuing keys, key shares and Certificates.
The Auditor is an entity providing a verification service of
all signatures produced by role occupants using their shares
of role private keys. The RK participates in all role signa-
ture generation processes and all role message decryption
processes. ROs are members of roles that perform messag-
ing actions on behalf of roles.
Figure 1: SRBM Architecture
4.1. Main components
The KGCA generates keys based on role private keys as
described in Section 3 for roles, ROs and RKs. The KGCA
generates thress types of keys or secrets, which are RO key
shares, Auditor secrets, and RK secrets.
ROs send and read messages through Message User
Agents (MUAs). All messages will be delivered to the
role Keeper before they are sent through the MTA or be-
fore they are accessed from the MS. The Message Transfer
Agent (MTA) is responsible for delivering messages to ei-
ther a local Message Store (MS) or a remote MTA via the
SMTP protocol [8]. The MS is a local database that stores
all messages and accepts either the POP3 protocol [11] or
the IMAP4 [6] protocol for message management and re-
trieval. Our implementation of managed messaging system
will be based on these standards.
The RK is responsible for cooperating with the ROs to
sign messages or decrypt messages. On signing messages,
ROs will submit their initial signatures with the original
messages. The RK will then re-sign the messages and com-
bine the new signatures with the ROs’ signatures, which
will then produce valid role signatures. The process is de-
scribed in Section 3.1. On decrypting messages, the RKwill
first conduct the keeper decryption and provide the result to
the RO, then the RO can perform the RO Decryption using
his key share, and reconstruct the plaintext. The decryption
process has been elaborated in Section 3.2.
The Auditor is responsible for verifying the identity of
role occupants who initiated the process of message signing
when necessary. The Auditor has access to the role verifica-
tion secret. A log is assumed to be produced by the system
which contains the original messages (or the hashes of the
messages), RO signatures, the RK signatures, and the RO
identities. Based on all the above information, the Audi-
tor can verify all RO’ signatures using the role verification
secrets. The verification process is described in Section 3.3.
4.2. Keys and Secrets
Three types of keys and secrets are generated by the
KGCA, including the RO key shares, the role verification
secret, and the RK secrets.
RO key shares are delivered to every corresponding in-
dividual RO. ROs may have multiple RO key shares if they
hold multiple role memberships, and they are responsible
for safely managing their RO key shares. Unauthorised dis-
closure of a RO’s key shares will enable a malicious user to
impersonate that RO.
The Auditor secrets are used by the system to verify RO
identities recorded in the log. The role verification secret
can be made either public within the organisation, which
allows every one in the organisation to perform verification,
or available to the RK and the Auditor only.
RK secrets are used by the RK to help ROs to sign or
decrypt messages. The RK secrets must be private to the
RK. Revealing the RK secrets to any RO will enable the
RO to reconstruct the role private key and sign or decrypt
messages without the aid of the RK.
4.3. Messaging Process
Secure messages are represented in S/MIME format [12]
to provide protection for the information. S/MIME allows
messages to be signed and encrypted in any sequence.
To send a message on behalf of a role using the proposed
scheme, a RO needs to compose a S/MIME message and
sign the message using her role key share. The message will
be sent to the RK via the MUA. On receiving an outgoing
message from a RO, the RK will reprocess the message,
and convert the RO’s signature into a valid role signature
and replace the RO’s signature in the message. The process
is specified in detail in Section 3.2.
To access a role message which is encrypted to the role,
a RO will need to submit a request to RK. RK will then de-
crypt the message based on the secret it holds and the RO’s
identity. The decryption result will be returned to the RO
with the original encrypted message. Then the RO can de-
crypt the message using her role key share and construct the
plaintext. The process is specified in more detail in Section
3.1.
When communication is required to be encrypted be-
tween the RO and the RK, all information can be encrypted
to the role, and then be partially decrypted before being
transferred to the other end. The recipient can reconstruct
the information in the way explained in Section 3.2.
Outgoing messages can not be triple wrapped (e.g.
signed then encrypted then signed with both signatures are
role signatues) unless extra protocol interactions are pro-
vided, because it is not possible to generate a valid outer
signature or partial outer signature without completing the
inner signature first. We are dubious if the benefits of triple
wrapping would outweigh the costs of such a complex in-
teraction.
4.4. Audit and Security Control
The audit service is performed by the Auditor. To enable
the Auditor to audit a role occupant’s identity, the system
must produce a log of all signing actions. For every sign-
ing, the log must contain the digest algorithm, the signing
algorithm, the message digest, the RO’s partial signature,
RK’s partial signature, and the claimed identity of the RO.
The Auditor will follow the algorithm presented in 3.3 to
verify if the claimed identity is authentic.
The SRBM system allows role occupants to send or ac-
cess role messages, but all messaging must be conducted
with the cooperation of the Role Gate Keeper. Any mes-
sage processing that is performed by a role occupant which
bypasses the Role Gate Keeper will not be able to be au-
thenticated as originating from that role. Thus all autho-
rised role based messages will need to pass through the Role
Gate Keeper. A Role Gate Keeper can be further endowed
with security control mechanisms so as to enforce local se-
curity policies on the messages. Local security controls may
constrain the dissemination of internal documents, limit the
scope of legitimate recipients, filter or remove unauthorised
information in messages, or even prevent role occupants
from accessing messages if the incoming messages do not
meet the necessary security criteria.
4.5. Revocation
Role membership assignments need to be dynamic. Re-
vocation of membership means that ROs can be deprived of
their role memberships. Membership revocation will stop
the RO from performing actions on behalf of the Role, thus
the revoked RO will not be able to sign and send messages
or decrypt and access messages on behalf of the role.
Role membership is usually revoked by a corresponding
management authority. Role membership revocation needs
only to be distributed to the related RK. Once informed, the
RKwill refuse to cooperate with the ROwhose membership
has been revoked. Since a RO has to gain the cooperation
of the related RK in order to send or access role messages,
non-cooperation of the RK stops the revoked role occupant
from performing the corresponding role. Note that the re-
vocation need not remove the RO’s key share from the RO,
since it may still be used by the RO, but to no good effect.
Furthermore the role public key and role private key can
remain unchanged, since others may still use the role pub-
lic key to validate role signatures and encrypt for the role,
whilst the private key shares held by all the other role occu-
pants are still valid.
5. Security Analysis
Potential attacks to the SRBM systems includes compro-
mising role private keys, spoofing role occupant identities,
and reusing revoked role occupant identities.
The ability to recompute the private key of the Role leads
to the ability to generate messages originating from the role
without the RK’s involvement, hence no gatekeeping au-
thorisation and security control would be performed. The
ability to recompute the private key share of a role occupant
would lead to the ability of an attacker to masquerade as the
role occupant.
In this scheme the Role’s private key is shared between
the RO and the RK in such a way that each share of the
private key is effectively a random number, assuming f is
a hash function randomly mapping inputs into an integer.
Thus it is not possible to use interpolation techniques to re-
compute the private key of the role or role occupants, even if
any number of role occupants collude. Similarly, role occu-
pants will not be able to perform any analysis of role private
keys based on the key shares they hold for different roles.
A RK on its own cannot recompute the role private key,
as it has only the RK secret shared with the CA. Only when
a RO colludes with the RK can they recompute the role pri-
vate key.
Compared with the security of keeping role private keys
in complete (unshared) form, it is safer to have the role pri-
vate keys split and stored in a distributed manner. Any at-
tempt to reveal a role private key has to compromise both a
RO and the RK in order to access both key shares.
It is shown in above that it is not trivial to compromise
a RO key share. Assuming an attacker collude with the RK
and tries to spoof o(r, j) to be o(r, i). RO o(r, j) produces
a signature sgro(r, j,m) and submits it to the RK.
On the re-signing stage, the RK produces a spoof expo-
nent spoofr,j,i = sr,j × vr,j × v−1r,i , and then produce a
keeper signature sg
′






kp(r, ji,m) can succeed in passing the
verification against the identity o(r, i) as the Auditor can
construct a valid role signature sg
′




vr,i = mdr (mod Nr). This means spoof-
ing o(r, i) has succeeded. However, in order to achieve the
spoof, it is necessary to compute (vr,i)−1, but since the two
primes used to construct Nr are known only to the PGCA,
computing (vr,i)−1 with them is as hard as the RSA prob-
lem. Thus assuming the RSA problem is hard, spoofing an
RO is hard as well and is unlikely to succeed.
Conventional systems depend on publishing Certifi-
cate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to revoke role memberships.
There is a time gap between the revocation of the member-
ship the delivery of the CRLs to the relying party. This time
gap allows revoked members to exercise their role without
being noticed for a limited period of time.
With the proposed SRBM scheme, recipients judge role
membership depending on role signatures only. Valid role
signatures imply a legitimate role membership. To revoke
role membership, the SRBM system only needs to notify the
related RK about the revocation. The RK will then reject all
cooperation requests from the revoked role member, pre-
venting the RO from signing or decrypting role messages.
6. Related Work
Mont et al [10] and Chadwick et al [4] both proposed
a model of role based messaging based on a trusted entity.
These two models can provide effective role membership
revocation, but the trusted entity is the central point of at-
tack. Breaking into the trusted entity will compromise the
security of the whole system.
Group signatures [5, 3] enable group members of a group
to sign messages on behalf of the group anonymously. The
signature can be verified using the group public key. Only
the trusted authority with the group secret can identify the
signer identity from a valid group signature. Group signa-
tures can facilitate the signing process of role based mes-
saging, but they fail to impose mandatory controls on the
generation of signatures, as well as they fail to support data
encryption and decryption.
Threshold cryptography [7] shares secrets among share-
holders, and requires at least any k out of t shareholders to
cooperate together to reconstruct the primary secret which
is the original private key. Threshold cryptography pro-
motes Ad Hoc cooperation between shareholders, which
makes it difficult to impose mandatory security control.
Boneh et al. [1] presented an approach for fast certifi-
cate revocation. The approach split the users’ RSA private
keys into two shares and managed by the users and a semi-
trusted entity respectively. To produce a valid signature or
decrypt a message, users have to acquire cooperation from
the semi-trust entity. Boneh et al. implemented the semi-
trusted entity to check the validity of users’ keys to achieve
fast certificate revocation. The difference between Boneh’s
system and ours is that, our system is designed to share role
identities and support security control, while Boneh’s sys-
tem is designed for protecting individuals’ private keys. Our
system is superior to Boneh et al. because it can be built us-
ing a single secret for all role occupants, and it allows an
Auditor to check which occupants acted in a given role.
A distributed algorithm to produce a RSA key pair and
its key shares jointly by a number of peers has been pro-
posed [9, 2]. Peers participating in the generation do no
know the private key or the key shares that others hold. This
system is superior to ours in that it does not require a CA to
know the private keys of the role occupants.
7. Conclusions
This paper has developed a distributed RSA scheme for
secure role based messaging, and presented the system ar-
chitecture of the proposed scheme. A security analysis is
also conducted to show the strength of the proposed scheme.
The advantages of the proposed scheme are five fold.
Firstly, the scheme promotes distributed security. Keys are
shared and distributed. Distributed security increases the
overall system security and protects the systems against at-
tacks by outsiders. Secondly, the scheme enables the audi-
tor to verify the actual identity of any user acting in a given
role, by checking the audit log of partial signatures. Thirdly,
the scheme supports fast membership revocation. Only the
Role Keeper needs to be informed when a role occupant is
removed from a role, and from then onwards the RO will
not be able to effectively use their role key share. Fourthly,
the scheme supports the imposition of mandatory security
controls. The Role Keeper is a critical entity involved in
all communications on behalf of roles, therefore it can be
employed as a checking point for imposing mandatory se-
curity controls. Fifthly, the scheme reduces the complexity
of key share management schemes by using keeper secrets
and verification secrets from which key shares can be auto-
matically generated.
The proposed scheme and model is not without its lim-
itations. Due to the way that role signatures are generated,
requiring the cooperation of both the role occupants and
the Role Keeper, roles can not send out a triple wrapped
S/MIME messages without new more complex protocol in-
teractions (see Section 4.3, unless the signatures are pro-
duced by different identities. As the proposed scheme is
based on RSA cryptographic algorithms, it is theoretically
as hard to break as RSA cryptography, and is also theoreti-
cally as efficient as RSA cryptography. On the other hand,
any valid attacks on RSA cryptography will be valid attacks
on the proposed scheme.
The contribution of this work is as follows. Firstly, we
identify the requirements of secure role based messaging by
recognising the need for distributed security, fast member-
ship revocation, mandatory security controls and identifica-
tion of role participation. Secondly, we propose a distrib-
uted RSA scheme which caters for these requirements. The
scheme is able to utilise system logs to identity role partic-
ipation, which is not provided by Boneh et al [1]. Thirdly,
we demonstrate the application of the proposed scheme by
developing a SRBM system architecture and depicting the
communication process. Fourthly, we provide a security
analysis of the proposed scheme showing the security per-
formance of the proposed scheme.
Future work will focus on further reducing the key man-
agement complexity of the proposed scheme, and will also
investigate the possibility of reducing the number of keys
held by a single RO which is expected to improve the user
friendliness of the scheme and simplify the user’s task of
key management. Building the scheme based on alternative
cryptography systems other than RSA will also be studied.
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